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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, a man used a firearm to claim thirty-three lives on the
campus of Virginia Tech, a public university.1 The next year, the
Supreme Court of the United States recognized, for the first time in
history, that individuals have the fundamental right under the Second Amendment to keep and bear arms within their homes for the
purpose of self-defense.2 Since 2008, federal circuit courts have either assumed or interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision to extend
to some sort of individual right to carry firearms in public.3 For over
a decade, the Supreme Court refused to weigh in on public carry;4
however, the Court recently granted certiorari in New York State
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen to resolve this question.5 Nevertheless,
the public carry issue in Bruen does not specifically deal with carrying firearms on college campuses.6
This begs the question, do individuals have the fundamental right
under the Second Amendment to carry firearms on the campus of a
public university? Additionally, can a public university totally ban
firearms on its campus without impeding on the constitutional right
to keep and bear arms protected by the Second Amendment? This
Note will argue that individuals have a narrow, but constitutionally
guaranteed, right to carry firearms on the campus of a public

1. Christine Hauser & Anahad O’Connor, Virginia Tech Shooting Leaves 33 Dead, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/16/us/16cnd-shooting.html [https://
perma.cc/V8DN-LQTH].
2. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
3. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) (assuming that the Second
Amendment protects the right to carry in public).
4. See Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1865 (2020) (denying certiorari on the public
carry issue).
5. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Corlett, 141 S. Ct. 2566, 2566 (2021) (Respondent’s
name changed to Bruen after Court granted the petition); Scott Neuman & Nina Totenberg,
Supreme Court to Take up 1st Major Gun Rights Case in More Than a Decade, NPR (Apr. 26,
2021, 5:03 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/26/990846329/supreme-court-to-take-up-firstmajor-gun-rights-case-in-more-than-a-decade [https://perma.cc/LA6W-ZCTL].
6. See Corlett, 141 S. Ct. at 2566 (granting certiorari to answer the narrow question of
“[w]hether the State’s denial of petitioners’ applications for concealed-carry licenses for selfdefense violated the Second Amendment”); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Beach, 818 F.
App’x 99, 100 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Corlett,
141 S. Ct. 2566 (2021).
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university. Therefore, it is beyond the power of states and public
universities to totally ban firearms from campus premises.
Part I is the backbone of this Note. Part I provides an overview of
the Second Amendment and the federal case law interpreting it.
This Part discusses the two most influential Supreme Court decisions on the Second Amendment: District of Columbia v. Heller and
McDonald v. City of Chicago.7 Determining the scope of the Second
Amendment necessarily requires an examination of these two cases.
The Heller opinion, although its holding is very narrow, is the most
detailed guidance lower courts have when determining the Second
Amendment’s scope.8 It is beyond the purview of this Note to
examine whether Heller and its progeny were correctly decided. Part
I will also discuss the various decisions by the federal circuit courts
on the issue of carrying firearms in public and why those decisions
support a fundamental right to carry in public.
Part II is the heart of this Note. Part II argues that individuals
have a slim constitutional right to carry firearms on the campus of
a public university. Part II then discusses why the Supreme Court
in Heller did not intend public universities to fall within its definition of “sensitive places,” although the Court specifically listed
“schools and government buildings” as examples.9 Part II relies on
Heller’s text and reasoning to support this contention. This Part also
uses dictionaries from around the time Heller was decided to parse
the meaning of Heller’s dicta. Both Heller’s historical approach and
First Amendment doctrine support the contention that public universities are not sensitive places. Heller and subsequent federal case
law interpreting the Second Amendment demonstrate why absolute
bans on campus carry fail constitutional muster. Consequently,
individuals do not necessarily give up their constitutional right to
keep and bear arms simply because they choose to step foot on the
campus of a public university.
Part III is the mind of this Note. Part III describes the broad
power of regulation that states, and universities, may enjoy without
7. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742 (2010); see, e.g., Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 670 (1st Cir. 2018) (“The Supreme
court’s seminal decision in Heller guides our voyage.”).
8. However, the Court is likely to provide additional guidance this term. See Corlett, 141
S. Ct. at 2566.
9. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
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infringing on the individual right to carry firearms on campus. The
purpose of Part III is not to describe every permissible way in which
states and public universities may regulate firearms on campus.
Rather, the goal of Part III is to illustrate that the implied constitutional right to carry firearms on the campus of a public university
is extremely narrow. Instead of attempting to hypothetically determine constitutionally permissible regulations on firearms, Part III
points to firearms regulations that federal courts have upheld as
constitutional. Part III will also analyze and expand on those decisions to provide helpful insight for states and public universities
when trying to regulate firearms on campus. This Note provides
counterarguments throughout, as many scholars have argued that
states and public universities have the power to totally prohibit any
and all firearms on campus.
I. INTERPRETING THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The Second Amendment reads, “[a] well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”10 Although the Second
Amendment is composed of only one sentence, its meaning and
scope are not straightforward.11 Its language is broad and leaves a
reader with more questions than answers.12 Thus, one must turn to
the Supreme Court of the United States for guidance on the meaning of the Second Amendment.
A. The Seminal Cases: Heller and McDonald
The Court’s most monumental decision interpreting the Second
Amendment is District of Columbia v. Heller.13 This decision laid
the foundation for contemporary Second Amendment law.14 Again,
the purpose of this Note is not to decide whether the Court in Heller
reached the correct decision. Instead, this Note will accept the

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

U.S. CONST. amend. II.
See id.
See id.
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
See id.
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Heller decision as the seminal Supreme Court case interpreting the
Second Amendment.
Unlike Second Amendment law, the facts of Heller were fairly
simple. Dick Heller was a security officer who frequently carried a
firearm, specifically a handgun, while performing his job-related
duties.15 However, D.C. law generally prohibited individuals from
possessing a pistol within their homes.16 Heller applied for a special
permit to allow him to carry a handgun within his home, but the
District of Columbia rejected his application.17 Subsequently, Heller
sued and argued that the D.C. laws were unconstitutional under the
Second Amendment.18 Heller’s case made it all the way up to the
Supreme Court.19
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, reaching the conclusion
that the D.C. laws forbidding Heller from carrying a pistol within
his home were unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.20 To
interpret the Second Amendment, the Court split the provision into
two parts: (1) the prefatory clause, “[a] well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State,” and (2) the operative
clause, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”21 The Court said that the prefatory clause merely states
the purpose of the operative clause, and it does not limit the right
to one that is collective.22 Therefore, the Court interpreted the
Second Amendment to protect an individual right “to keep and bear
arms.”23
Two years after Heller, the Court took up the case of McDonald
v. City of Chicago.24 Like the District of Columbia in Heller, Chicago
and one of its suburbs prohibited the possession of handguns within one’s home.25 The plaintiffs, wishing to possess such firearms,
15. Id. at 575.
16. Id. at 574-75.
17. Id. at 575.
18. Id. at 575-76.
19. Id. at 576.
20. Id. at 573, 635.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. II; see Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.
22. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577-79. Collective rights are “rights that may be exercised only
through participation in some corporate body.” Id. at 579.
23. Id. at 595, 598.
24. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
25. Id. at 749-50.
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challenged the constitutionality of the pistol bans under both the
Second and Fourteenth Amendments.26 The Court agreed with the
plaintiffs.27 McDonald’s legal effect was to incorporate the individual right recognized in Heller to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.28
It is important to note that Heller’s core holding was very narrow.29 Heller only held that the Second Amendment guarantees a
fundamental individual right to carry a handgun, for the purpose of
self-defense, within one’s home.30 However, Heller’s dicta provides
great insight into the scope of the Second Amendment. Specifically,
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis
today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,
or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places
such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.31

In a footnote to the sentence quoted above, the Court noted, “[w]e
identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as
examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”32 However,
the Court failed to fully define “sensitive places.”33 The Court
provided “schools and government buildings” as examples, but it is
unclear from the phrase itself whether public universities are
included.34

26. See id. at 752.
27. See id. at 750, 791.
28. Id.
29. See James M. Manley, Defining the Second Amendment Right to Carry: Objective
Limits on a Fundamental Right, 14 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 81, 87-88 (2012).
30. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791 (“In Heller, we held that the Second Amendment
protects the right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense.”).
31. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008).
32. Id. at 627 n.26.
33. See id. at 626.
34. See id.
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B. Public Carry: The “Circuit Split”
Since Heller, the federal circuit courts have struggled to determine whether the individual right guaranteed by the Second
Amendment extends outside the home, and what the scope of that
right is.35 Scholars have noted a circuit split and have voiced their
opinions on the issue.36 However, as discussed below, the circuit case
law after Heller strongly suggests that an individual constitutional
right to carry firearms in public exists.
1. Circuits Declaring an Individual Right to Public Carry
In 2012, the Seventh Circuit struck down Illinois laws that effectively prohibited the carrying of loaded firearms in public.37 The
court was clear that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right to carry firearms outside the home.38 Specifically, the majority
opined, “[t]he Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside.”39
In 2017, the D.C. Circuit struck down a D.C. law that prevented
most residents of the District from carrying a gun in public.40 The
law required applicants wishing to carry in public to demonstrate a
“good reason to fear injury” or “any other proper reason for carrying
a pistol.”41 The D.C. Circuit read Heller and the Second Amendment
more broadly than the other circuits and held that “the individual
35. See Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1868 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (explaining that the circuits have reached different conclusions regarding the
right to carry in public).
36. See John C. Frazer, Home, Sweet Home? The Second Amendment and the Right to
Carry Firearms in Public, 4 REGENT J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1, 4-5, 22 (2012) (arguing that there
is an individual right to carry in public); Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry
Guns Outside the Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 226, 229-30 (2008) (arguing that the
home/public line drawn in Heller is justified); Jackson Carter, Comment, Take Your Guns to
Town: Expanding the Scope of the Second Amendment Beyond the Home, 83 MISS. L.J. SUPRA
101, 103-04 (2014) (arguing that there is an individual right to carry a handgun in public for
self-defense).
37. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
38. See id. at 942.
39. Id.
40. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 655, 666, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
41. Id. at 655 (quoting D.C. Code § 22-4506(a)-(b) (2009)).
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right to carry common firearms beyond the home for self-defense—
even in densely populated areas, even for those lacking special selfdefense needs—falls within the core of the Second Amendment’s
protections.”42
2. Circuits Assuming an Individual Right to Public Carry
In 2011, the Fourth Circuit upheld a defendant’s criminal conviction for carrying a loaded pistol in a motor vehicle at a national
park.43 The majority assumed that an individual right to carry firearms in public exists by explaining that individual gun rights are
subject to more regulation in public.44 If individual gun rights are
more limited in public, it follows that there are some individual gun
rights in public.45 One judge wrote separately for part of the opinion,
explicitly declaring that individuals have the constitutional right
to bear arms in public.46
In 2012, the Second Circuit upheld New York’s concealed carry
licensing requirement, which required individuals to show a “proper
cause” for carrying a concealed firearm in public.47 Although the
court upheld New York’s “proper cause” requirement, the court did
not grant states the implicit power to completely prohibit the carrying of firearms in public.48 Rather, the court assumed, and implied,
that a constitutional right to carry in public exists by noting that
the individual right to carry outside the home is more limited than
the right to carry within the home.49
In 2013, the Third Circuit upheld New Jersey’s requirement that
applicants wishing to carry firearms in public for self-defense show

42. See id. at 661.
43. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 459-60 (4th Cir. 2011).
44. See id. at 470. The Fourth Circuit also assumed that a right to carry in public exists
in a later case in which it upheld Maryland’s good reason requirement for carrying handguns.
See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013).
45. See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470.
46. Id. at 468 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (“[I]t follows that the right extends to public areas beyond the home.”).
47. Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 83, 101 (2d Cir. 2012).
48. See id. at 91 (“New York’s proper cause requirement does not operate as a complete
ban on the possession of handguns in public.”).
49. See id. at 89.
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a “justifiable need” for doing so.50 Like the Second Circuit, the Third
Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the Second Amendment
guarantees an individual right to carry firearms in public.51 In 2018,
the First Circuit followed suit by similarly assuming, without deciding, that the Second Amendment implies an individual right to carry firearms beyond the home.52
In summary, the circuits weighing in on the issue of public carry
have either assumed or declared that some constitutional right to
carry firearms in public exists.53 Notably, in 2016, the Ninth Circuit
refused to answer the question altogether.54 The circuits have varied
in their holdings and the scrutiny they have applied to laws challenged under the Second Amendment,55 but there is certainly a consensus among the federal circuit courts that Heller and the Second
Amendment imply an individual right to carry in public.56 However,
as the Second and Fourth Circuits have noted, the right to carry
firearms in public is not as robust as it is within one’s home.57
Additionally, at least one current Supreme Court Justice has
expressly declared that there is an individual constitutional right
to carry firearms in public.58 A second Justice has agreed with that
declaration.59 Other Justices expressed their concerns with New
York’s “proper cause” law during oral arguments in New York State
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.60 Thus, in Bruen, the Supreme Court
50. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 428, 440 (3d Cir. 2013).
51. See id. at 431.
52. See Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 670 (1st Cir. 2018) (interpreting Heller to imply
a right to public carry).
53. See, e.g., Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89 (assuming individuals have some right to carry in
public); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (declaring
individuals have some right to carry in public).
54. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“The
Second Amendment may or may not protect, to some degree, a right of a member of the
general public to carry firearms in public.”).
55. Compare Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 666 (declining to apply any tier of scrutiny), with Drake,
724 F.3d at 435 (applying intermediate scrutiny).
56. See, e.g., Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89.
57. See id.; United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011).
58. See Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1868 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (“[T]he Second Amendment protects a right to public carry.”).
59. See Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1996, 1998 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (Justice Gorsuch joining).
60. Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Seems Poised to Expand Second Amendment Rights
and Strike Down NY Handgun Law, CNN (Nov. 3, 2021, 2:44 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
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will likely hold, consistent with this Note, that there is a constitutional right to carry firearms in public.61
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CARRY FIREARMS ON CAMPUS
Heller and its progeny suggest there is a constitutional right to
generally carry firearms in public. Now it is important to determine
whether that right remains intact on public university campuses.
Heller specifically mentioned that certain “sensitive places” are subject to less Second Amendment protection,62 but the Court did not
intend to include public universities as sensitive places. Instead,
Heller and subsequent cases support a narrow constitutional right
to carry firearms on public university campuses.
A. Heller Did Not Intend “Schools” to Include College Campuses
Given the widespread agreement that individuals have the right
to publicly carry firearms, it is important to determine whether that
right extends to carrying on public universities’ campuses. Remember, Heller’s dicta specifically stated that its opinion did not cast
doubt on “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings.”63 One might
presume that this language forecloses any possibility of an individual right to carry firearms on campus because public universities
are “schools,” which Heller explicitly provided as an example of
sensitive places.64 Some scholars agree with this simple analysis.65
Shaundra Lewis takes this position by stating, “there is nothing in
[Heller] that indicates that the Court did not intend for colleges and
universities to be encompassed in the term ‘schools.’” 66 Although
compelling at first glance, this argument is misguided.

2021/11/03/politics/supreme-court-second-amendment-new-york-bruen/index.html [https://
perma.cc/L9X4-G4YL].
61. See id.
62. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See Shaundra K. Lewis, Crossfire on Compulsory Campus Carry Laws: When the First
and Second Amendments Collide, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2109, 2135 (2017).
66. Id.
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The Court in Heller did not intend public universities to be included in the term schools. While public universities are definitely
schools in the broad sense, common usage of the word “schools” supports the contention that the term does not include college campuses. Similar to the Court in Heller, which examined the intent
and meaning behind the Second Amendment’s text,67 this Note uses
a comparable method to examine the meaning of Heller’s dicta.
Law dictionaries from around the time Heller was decided provide some guidance. Black’s Law Dictionary from 2004, four years
before the Heller decision, defined school as “[a]n institution of
learning and education, esp[ecially] for children.”68 The 1999 and
2009 editions of the Black’s Law Dictionary identically mirror the
2004 edition’s definition of “school.”69 Colleges are for adults, not
children. Elementary, middle, and high schools are for children.
Although in exceptional circumstances children may attend college,70 this does not change the fact that public universities and
colleges are largely composed of adults.71 Therefore, these dictionary
definitions support the contention that the Court in Heller intended
the word schools to encompass only elementary, middle, and high
school institutions.72 Joan Miller takes this same position and
indicates that arguing otherwise would be onerous.73 A second
scholar writing on campus carry interpreted the Heller opinion to
deem “pre-K-12 schools” as sensitive places.74

67. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 576-98.
68. See School, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
69. Compare id., with School, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) [hereinafter School
2009], and School, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
70. See DiGiacinto v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 704 S.E.2d 365, 367 (Va.
2011) (explaining that a public university had students who were under the age of eighteen).
71. Michael Rogers, Note, Guns on Campus: Continuing Controversy, 38 J. COLL. & U.L.
663, 674-75 (2012).
72. Modern state laws also limit the definition of “school” to pre-K-12 institutions. See,
e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.237a(6)(b) (2017) (defining “school” as “a public, private,
denominational, or parochial school offering developmental kindergarten, kindergarten, or
any grade from 1 through 12”).
73. See Joan H. Miller, Comment, The Second Amendment Goes to College, 35 SEATTLE
UNIV. L. REV. 235, 248 (2011).
74. See Aurora Temple Barnes, Guns and Academic Freedom, 53 GONZ. L. REV. 45, 58
(2017). Barnes does not explicitly state that public universities are excluded, but it is noteworthy she wrote “pre-K-12 schools,” rather than simply writing “schools.” See id.
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Ballentine’s Law Dictionary from 1969 more explicitly supports
the argument that the term schools does not encompass public universities.75 Under the definition of school, the dictionary states: “In
usual sense, exclusive of university, college, business college, or
other institution of higher education.”76 Although quite old, this
dictionary was published during the early legal career of Justice
Scalia,77 who wrote for the majority in Heller.78 This definition
makes it clear that the word “school” has had a relatively stable,
rather than evolving, meaning over time.79
Common usage of the word school in other contexts further
illustrates this point. The clearest example is when people use the
word “school-age” to describe a person’s age. For example, say that
someone reads a flyer that details a contest, and the flyer states
that all contestants must be “school-age.” Common sense would
indicate to most people reading the flyer that college students are
unable to participate. Similarly, the Court in Heller intended
schools to merely mean the word’s most common definition, which
excludes public universities.80 However, schools were mentioned only as examples of sensitive places in Heller.81 Therefore, this does
not stop someone from arguing that even if public universities were
not intended to be included as schools, public universities are still
sensitive places.82
B. Public Universities Are Not “Sensitive Places”
Public universities are not sensitive places under Heller. While
the definition of sensitive places remains up for debate,83 the D.C.
Circuit and at least one federal district court agree that places are
75. See School, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter School 1969].
76. Id.
77. See id.; Aaron M. Houck, Antonin Scalia, BRITANNICA (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.
britannica.com/biography/Antonin-Scalia [https://perma.cc/CUW2-DTTZ].
78. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008).
79. Compare School 2009, supra note 69, with School 1969, supra note 75.
80. See School 1969, supra note 75.
81. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
82. See id. This is precisely the argument that Miller makes. See Miller, supra note 73,
at 248.
83. See Darrell A. H. Miller, Constitutional Conflict and Sensitive Places, 28 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 459, 465 (2019).
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sensitive “because of ‘the people found there’ or the ‘activities that
take place there.’”84 This definition, Heller’s implication that the
home is not a sensitive place, and First Amendment doctrine demonstrate that public universities do not qualify as sensitive places.
1. Heller and the Home as a Non-Sensitive Place
Heller implies that the home is not a sensitive place because
Heller’s holding recognized the individual right to carry firearms
within the home for self-defense purposes.85 Heller mentioned
sensitive places in its dicta as possible exceptions to this fundamental right, providing the two examples of “schools and government
buildings.”86 In other words, Heller stands for the proposition that
homes are not sensitive while schools and government buildings
are sensitive.87
One might reach a quick conclusion by arguing public universities are more similar to schools and government buildings than
homes; therefore, the campuses of public universities are sensitive
places. However, as federal courts have noted, a place is sensitive
because of the people or activities found there,88 not because the
place itself is more similar to a school or government building, nor
because the place is different than a home. Thus, instead of a
straightforward comparison of two places, it is necessary to compare
the people and activities found at the places.
When examining the people and activities found at public universities, it becomes clear that they do not qualify as sensitive
places. The court that created the people and activities definition
explained that schools are sensitive because of the people found
within them, while government buildings are sensitive because of
the activities that occur within them.89 The people and activities

84. United States v. Class, 930 F.3d 460, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting GeorgiaCarry.Org,
Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1319 (M.D. Ga. 2011)).
85. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
86. Id. at 626-27.
87. See id. at 626-27, 636.
88. See Class, 930 F.3d at 465.
89. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d at 1319. The court noted that “[a]
reasonable argument can be made that places of worship are also sensitive places because of
the activities that occur there;” however, the court refused to reach such a conclusion. See id.
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definition rests on the premise that children attend schools and the
fact that courts have considered children as defenseless people.90 If
people are what determine the distinction, then public universities
are not to be considered sensitive places because they are primarily
composed of adults rather than children.
Although up for interpretation, the activities occurring in government buildings that deem them sensitive places are likely activities which can easily provoke others.91 For example, courtrooms
have activities within them, such as adversarial court proceedings,
that can easily lead to someone becoming provoked.92 The activities
occurring in any legislative, executive, or judicial building can easily
provoke someone. This is why there are “longstanding prohibitions
on the possession of firearms” in such locations.93 Accordingly, some
commentators have argued or assumed that the controversial nature of the material conveyed at public universities characterizes
them as sensitive places.94
However, the courts must draw a line. Heller and the Second
Amendment cannot stand for the proposition that simply because a
place contains activities that are controversial, all Second Amendment rights are thrown out the door. This principle is obvious given
that controversial speech and activities often occur within one’s
home. Spouses often disagree politically, and families may discuss
controversial topics amongst themselves within their home.95 But
those facts do not destroy individual gun rights under Heller.

90. See Brian C. Whitman, Comment, In Defense of Self-Defense: Heller’s Second
Amendment in Sensitive Places, 81 MISS. L.J. 1987, 1992 (2012).
91. See, e.g., Ted Barrett, Manu Raju & Peter Nickeas, US Capitol Secured, 4 Dead After
Rioters Stormed the Halls of Congress to Block Biden’s Win, CNN (Jan. 7, 2021, 3:33 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/06/politics/us-capitol-lockdown/index.html [https://perma.cc/
66AT-ZJ2S].
92. E.g., WATCH: Brawl Breaks out in Ohio Courtroom During Sentencing for Killer,
WFLA (July 11, 2019, 12:56 PM), https://wfla.com/news/watch-brawl-breaks-out-in-ohio-court
room-during-sentencing-for-killer/ [https://perma.cc/FVK6-QUBL].
93. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
94. See Luke Morgan, Note, Leave Your Guns at Home: The Constitutionality of a Prohibition on Carrying Firearms at Political Demonstrations, 68 DUKE L.J. 175, 211 (2018); Lewis,
supra note 65, at 2129, 2132, 2135.
95. See, e.g., Molly Langmuir, Donald Trump Is Destroying My Marriage, N.Y. MAG. (Nov.
27, 2018), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/donald-trump-is-destroying-my-marriage.
html [https://perma.cc/64FA-NDCL].
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Perhaps the distinction is that the activities occurring in courtrooms and other similar government buildings are primarily adversarial, whereas presumably most activities within one’s home are
non-adversarial.96 Whatever the distinction may be, as in the home,
controversial material is often conveyed at public universities.97
Nevertheless, the bulk of information conveyed at public universities is noncontroversial. Although the people and activities definition remains ambiguous, the activities occurring at a public
university are no more sensitive than activities that frequently
occur within one’s home, such as heated debates over politics or religion. Thus, there is no reason to believe public universities qualify
as sensitive places simply because controversial topics are sometimes mentioned in class.
Heller implies the home is not a sensitive place because the Court
preserved Second Amendment rights within the home but suggested
in dicta that sensitive places like schools and government buildings
should be treated differently.98 In sum, the people and activities
found at public universities are more similar to the people and activities found at a non-sensitive place, such as the home.
2. First Amendment Rights
Many scholars have used First Amendment doctrine to interpret
sensitive places.99 However, these approaches have varied tremendously.100 Scholars likely focus on First Amendment doctrine to help
96. This distinction also presents issues because there are government buildings with
activities that are not primarily adversarial. Heller never stated that gun prohibitions in
government buildings were always lawful, rather that they were “presumptively lawful.” See
Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.
97. E.g., Mike Luery, VIDEO: Dispute over Politics Leads to Fight at Sacramento State,
KCRA (Dec. 8, 2019, 6:43 PM), https://kcra.com/article/video-dispute-politics-fight-sacramen
to-state/30162704 [https://perma.cc/TBY3-EB6S].
98. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
99. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 94, at 182 (arguing that bans on armed political protests
are constitutional because the First Amendment limits Heller’s sensitive places dicta in
“places where the presence of guns negatively impacts the exercise of free speech”).
100. Compare Lewis, supra note 65, at 2117-34 (arguing that guns on campus burden free
speech and that the notion of academic freedom overrides any potential Second Amendment
rights on campus), with Jordan E. Pratt, A First Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller’s
“Schools” and “Government Buildings”, 92 NEB. L. REV. 537, 574-79 (2013) (arguing that First
Amendment doctrine suggests colleges are excluded from Heller’s sensitive places dicta).
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interpret the Second Amendment because the Court in Heller
analogized to the First Amendment multiple times.101 Overall, First
Amendment doctrine suggests that schools should be treated differently than college campuses in the Second Amendment context,
further supporting the notion that universities are not sensitive
places.
One argument is to read the First Amendment as a limit on the
Second Amendment.102 Shaundra Lewis has advocated that, in the
campus carry context, a university’s constitutional right of “academic freedom” outweighs any potential Second Amendment rights
on campus.103 The argument follows that colleges can and should
ban all guns from campus.104 However, this position disregards the
importance of an enumerated constitutional right, which Heller
repeatedly emphasized.105 Lewis herself admits that the right of
academic freedom has not been enumerated by the Supreme Court,
and there are scholarly arguments that it is simply a defense rather
than a constitutional right.106 While the right to keep and bear arms
is expressly stated in the Second Amendment,107 a constitutional
right of academic freedom is nowhere to be found in the First
Amendment.108 It is far too attenuated to argue that a constitutional
right “strongly suggested” (but never announced) by the Supreme
Court, nor contained in the Constitution, trumps an enumerated
right.109
101. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 582, 595, 635.
102. See Lewis, supra note 65, at 2134-41 (arguing First Amendment rights trump Second
Amendment rights in the campus carry context); Shaundra K. Lewis, Bullets and Books by
Legislative Fiat: Why Academic Freedom and Public Policy Permit Higher Education
Institutions to Say No to Guns, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 13-17 (2011) (arguing state laws that
compel colleges to allow campus carry violate the First Amendment); Morgan, supra note 94,
at 213 (arguing that a place is sensitive when guns will burden core First Amendment rights
there).
103. See Lewis, supra note 65, at 2117-33.
104. See Lewis, supra note 102, at 28.
105. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27, 634.
106. See Lewis, supra note 102, at 17.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”).
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Lewis, supra note 65, at 2117 (“[T]he constitutional right
to academic freedom is not expressly stated in the First Amendment.”).
109. Compare U.S. Const. amend. II (announcing the right “to keep and bear [a]rms”), with
Lewis, supra note 65, at 2117 (explaining that the right of academic freedom is not in the
First Amendment), and Lewis, Bullets and Books, supra note 102, at 17 (explaining that the
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A stronger scholarly argument is that First Amendment doctrine
supports the contention that colleges are less sensitive than schools;
therefore, universities are not sensitive places under Heller’s dicta.110 Jordan Pratt advanced this argument by explaining Supreme
Court decisions that have interpreted First Amendment rights to
be more limited in schools than at universities.111 Luke Morgan
has criticized Pratt’s argument as borrowing too much from the
First Amendment,112 yet the crux of Morgan’s argument is that
Heller’s sensitive places dicta should be interpreted based on First
Amendment concerns, rather than Second Amendment concerns.113
Although Pratt’s argument borrows from the First Amendment, it
helps explain why the Court intended to treat colleges differently
than schools in the Second Amendment context.114
Morgan argued that “[n]othing about college students having
greater free speech rights than kindergarteners indicates that
undergrads should also have the right to carry a weapon to Philosophy 101.”115 The problem with this statement is that Morgan
misleads the reader by making a comparison of the rights themselves, rather than a comparison of the places, which is ultimately
the debate.116 The argument here is not over the two rights themselves, but how to interpret why certain places are sensitive. Heller
implies that something about the places themselves allows for
more regulation.117 Furthermore, Morgan overlooks the fact that
colleges are primarily composed of adults who can actually buy
firearms, while schools are primarily composed of children who
cannot.118 In sum, First Amendment doctrine illustrates that
right of academic freedom has yet to be announced by the Supreme Court).
110. See Pratt, supra note 100, at 576-79.
111. See id.
112. See Morgan, supra note 94, at 211.
113. See id. at 213 (“[C]ourts should adopt the following test: a place is sensitive under
Heller when introducing guns into that place seriously threatens core First Amendment
interests or activity.”).
114. See Pratt, supra note 100, at 576-79.
115. Morgan, supra note 94, at 211.
116. See id.
117. The adjective “sensitive” preceding the noun “places” suggests that the sensitivity of
the places is what permits the greater restriction of constitutional rights in such places. See
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008).
118. See 18 U.S.C § 922(b)(1) (making it illegal for gun dealers to sell shotguns, rifles, and
ammunition to anyone under the age of eighteen or to sell handguns to anyone under the age
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constitutional rights are subject to more regulation in schools than
on college campuses, which explains why Heller did not intend to
include college campuses as sensitive places.
C. Federal Case Law Suggests Absolute Gun Bans on Campus
Are Unconstitutional
Even if public universities can be defined as sensitive places,
federal case law suggests that total bans on all firearms on college
campuses are unconstitutional, which, in turn, implies that there is
some constitutional right to carry on campus. So far, this Note has
characterized the campus carry issue as whether individuals have
the individual right to carry firearms on campus. The issue can also
be framed this way: Can a public university constitutionally prohibit any and all firearms from its campus? If a public university
(or state) cannot constitutionally ban all firearms from its campus,
then some individual right to carry firearms on campus must exist.
In what follows, this Note argues that Heller and its progeny suggest absolute prohibitions on firearms on campus are unconstitutional.
Michael Rogers, a law student writing on campus carry, reached
this same conclusion and suggested that courts should apply strict
scrutiny to absolute firearms bans on campus.119 This Note agrees
with Rogers’s contention that absolute prohibitions on campus are
unconstitutional, but this Note does not suggest or analyze hypothetical total bans under any tier of scrutiny. This is because the
sensitive places doctrine originated from Heller, in which the Court
specifically refused to apply any tier of scrutiny to a prohibition on
handgun possession within the home.120 Heller notes that “longstanding prohibitions” on firearms in sensitive places are “presumptively lawful.”121 Interpreting this language to mean that courts
should apply the lowest level of scrutiny to firearms bans in sensitive places is too far of a stretch—especially given that the Court
of twenty-one).
119. See Rogers, supra note 71, at 700 (“[O]utright firearm bans on college and university
campuses, due to their distant reach, absolute nature, and scope of effect, warrant the highest
level of scrutiny.”).
120. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29.
121. Id. at 626, 627 n.26.
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in Heller refused to apply a specific level of scrutiny to a ban on a
particular type of firearm, namely, handguns.122
1. The Tiers of Scrutiny Do Not Apply to Absolute Bans
The Court in Heller faced a constitutional challenge to a D.C.
law that effectively prohibited Dick Heller from possessing a handgun within his home.123 However, the Court struck down the ban
without applying a traditional tier of scrutiny.124 Specifically, the
Court stated, “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have
applied to enumerated constitutional rights, [the District of Columbia’s prohibition] would fail constitutional muster.”125 Rather,
the Court simply said that the law was a “severe restriction.”126 The
Heller Court’s failure to apply a specific level of scrutiny left lower
courts with little practical guidance when dealing with Second
Amendment challenges.127 However, Heller counsels in favor of lower courts not applying any specific standard of scrutiny when facing
complete bans or “severe restriction[s]” like the D.C. law that was
at issue.128 Instead of applying a standard of scrutiny, Heller focused
on the history of gun regulations and the Second Amendment to
strike down the D.C. law.129
Many federal circuit courts have followed Heller’s analysis when
faced with absolute prohibitions on firearms. In 2012, the Seventh
Circuit did not apply any standard of scrutiny when it struck down
a law effectively prohibiting the public carrying of firearms.130
Similarly, in 2017, the D.C. Circuit declined to apply a tier of
scrutiny when it struck down a law that it categorized as a complete

122. See id. at 628-29.
123. Id. at 574-75.
124. Id. at 628-29.
125. Id. (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 629.
127. See Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining
Heller’s failure to define the scope of public carry and the appropriate standard); United
States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining the unsettled law
regarding the scope of public carry).
128. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29.
129. See id. at 595, 629 (emphasizing the importance of history throughout the opinion).
130. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934, 941-42 (7th Cir. 2012).
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ban.131 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that Heller’s refusal to apply a
level of scrutiny stopped lower courts from finding persuasive
grounds to uphold total bans.132 Even circuits that have applied
intermediate scrutiny to gun regulations have adamantly pointed
out that the laws upheld were not complete bans on firearms.133
Before applying intermediate scrutiny and upholding New York’s
“proper cause” requirement, the Second Circuit pointed out that the
law did “not operate as a complete ban on the possession of handguns in public.”134 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit followed this
approach by differentiating Maryland’s good reason requirement
from an absolute ban before applying intermediate scrutiny and
upholding the law.135 These approaches by federal circuit courts
illustrate Heller’s stringency toward absolute bans on firearms and
the common practice of not applying a standard of scrutiny to
absolute bans on firearms.
One might think that Heller’s sensitive places language explicitly carved out an exception for absolute bans in places that are deemed sensitive; however, this contention reads Heller’s sensitive places
dicta far too broadly. In footnote twenty-six, the Court noted that its
sensitive places dicta simply identified “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”136 The words “presumptively lawful” may lead
one to believe that the lowest level of scrutiny should be applied to
firearms prohibitions in such places.
Practically speaking, this interpretation makes little sense: if
courts applied mere rational basis scrutiny to all gun regulations in
sensitive places, almost every measure would be upheld because of
the danger that firearms pose.137 This would leave litigants with
little ability to challenge any gun regulations in sensitive places
under the Second Amendment. If virtually all gun regulations in
sensitive places, including absolute bans, would be upheld under rational basis scrutiny, then there would be no reason for the Heller
131. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 665-66, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
132. Id. at 665.
133. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012).
134. Id.
135. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 881 (4th Cir. 2013).
136. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 n.26 (2008).
137. See id. at 628 n.27 (explaining that nearly every law would survive rational basis
scrutiny).
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Court to precede the word “lawful” with “presumptively.”138 The
term “presumptively” implies that some regulations within sensitive
places are unlawful.139 Absolute bans on firearms are the most
restrictive gun regulations that can be imposed within sensitive
places. Thus, this word usage implies that such a severe restriction
is likely unconstitutional.140 If the Court intended the language to
be read broadly, it could have simply excluded the word “presumptively” and simply stated that measures in sensitive places were
lawful. More importantly, Heller itself stated in the very next
footnote that the D.C. law at issue would pass rational basis
scrutiny, but that such a test is inapplicable to enumerated rights
like those in the Second Amendment.141 Specifically, the Court
stated, “[i]f all that was required to overcome the right to keep and
bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be
redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”142 Therefore, a narrower interpretation of Heller’s sensitive places dicta is more persuasive and
more aligned with the Heller Court’s intentions.
The sensitive places dicta seems to operate more as a factor
weighing in favor of upholding a gun regulation rather than a
straightforward exception.143 Thus, when courts are faced with
138. See id. at 627 n.26.
139. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 679 (4th Cir. 2010) (“In fact, the phrase
‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures’ suggests the possibility that one or more of these
‘longstanding’ regulations ‘could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge.’”
(quoting United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010))). The court in Chester
followed Heller by expressly rejecting rational basis review and declined the interpretation
that Heller’s “longstanding prohibitions” language was a straightforward exception for gun
regulations. See id.
140. If absolute bans on any and all firearms in sensitive places are constitutional, then
the word “presumptively” is useless because restricting all firearms from a sensitive place is
the most restrictive gun measure that can be imposed. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629.
141. See id. at 628 n.27; Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1256 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (“Heller clearly does reject any kind of ‘rational basis’ or reasonableness test.”);
Chester, 628 F.3d at 682 (“Heller ... indicate[d] that rational basis review would not apply in
this context.”).
142. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
143. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 679 (rejecting the idea that Heller’s “longstanding
prohibitions” language was a “safe harbor” for gun measures because that would be applying
rational basis scrutiny in the Second Amendment context, which is forbidden by Heller). In
dicta, the Third Circuit has taken the opposite approach by explaining that Heller’s dicta
works as an exception. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010).
Notably, however, the Third Circuit assumed that the challenged law burdened Second
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absolute bans in sensitive places, they should follow Heller and
federal circuit courts by refusing to apply a typical standard of
scrutiny.144 The fact that a place is sensitive should certainly support upholding a gun regulation, but the characterization itself
should not be determinative. Rather, courts should follow Heller
by invoking its historical method when dealing with constitutional challenges to absolute bans on firearms in sensitive places.
In the context of a public university, the most severe and restrictive gun regulation would be a total prohibition on all firearms.
There would be no need to apply any tier of scrutiny to such an absolute prohibition according to Heller and subsequent decisions by
federal circuit courts.145 Thus, a court facing an absolute firearms
ban on a college campus should invoke Heller’s historical approach
to determine whether the challenged restriction is constitutional.146
In the next Section, this Note describes how a complete ban on firearms at a public university fails under Heller’s historical approach.
Therefore, following Heller and subsequent federal case law, an
absolute ban on firearms on a public university campus would likely
fail constitutional muster.
2. Absolute Firearms Bans on Campus Fail Heller’s Historical
Method
Under Heller’s historical analysis, a total firearms prohibition on
campus would likely be held unconstitutional, which implies that
individuals have some constitutional right to carry firearms on
campus. Until the Supreme Court provides further guidance, it is
necessary for lower courts to roll up their sleeves and apply a
historical-based approach to absolute firearms bans, even if those
bans are in sensitive places. This analysis is most aligned with the

Amendment rights, and it chose to apply intermediate scrutiny rather than upholding the law
as falling under the exception it claimed Heller’s dicta created. See id. at 95. Furthermore, the
court relied on Heller’s express rejection of rational basis scrutiny for laws burdening Second
Amendment rights. See id. at 95-96.
144. See supra notes 120-35 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 120-35 and accompanying text.
146. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (describing that
Heller used a historical analysis and that it is the appropriate test for absolute firearms bans).
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Court’s approach in Heller.147 When examining the history of gun
measures on college campuses, it becomes easily understood that
total bans on campus are likely unconstitutional.
Scholars David Kopel and Joseph Greenlee argued that Heller’s
sensitive places dicta has “a weak foundation in history and tradition.”148 They analyzed the earliest gun regulations at public
universities and reached the conclusion that the regulations do not
underpin Heller’s designation of schools as sensitive places.149
Perhaps they reached this conclusion because they miscategorized
public universities as schools.150 Nevertheless, their examination of
early campus gun regulations actually supports the contention that
absolute gun prohibitions on campus are unconstitutional under
Heller’s historical method.
Specifically, Kopel and Greenlee noted that the College of New
Jersey, Rutgers University’s predecessor, allowed guns on campus
in 1853, but the state made pistol ranges illegal if they were within
three miles of the campus.151 In 1874, New Jersey enacted a similar
law for Drew University, but the state again refused to ban guns
from the campus.152 The University of Virginia banned firearms in
1824 after student rioting, but the measure was not an absolute
ban because it applied only to students.153 Mississippi banned concealed carry at all colleges in 1878, but the law applied only to
students and allowed open carry.154
Kopel and Greenlee’s research shows that states and universities
that promulgated some campus gun restrictions still refrained from
enacting absolute prohibitions. Importantly, James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson were part of the board at the University of
Virginia that chose to ban students from having firearms on
campus.155 Yet even after riots and shootings on campus, Madison
147. See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (emphasizing the
importance of history throughout the opinion).
148. David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine: Locational
Limits on the Right to Bear Arms, 13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 205, 294 (2018).
149. Id. at 249-52.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 250-51.
152. Id. at 251.
153. See id. at 249-50.
154. Id. at 251-52.
155. Id. at 250.
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and Jefferson did not enact an absolute gun ban.156 Perhaps that
was because, as drafters of America’s founding documents, the
Second Amendment was in the back of their minds.
Modern laws also support a Second Amendment right to carry on
campus. As Shaundra Lewis explained, there has been a modern
trend of states removing very restrictive campus gun laws, and
some states now require colleges to permit campus carry.157 Lewis
noted that only a minority of states “expressly ban” campus carry.158
Even among the seventeen states that Lewis mentions “expressly
ban” campus carry, a closer examination of those laws reveals that
many of them are not absolute bans.159 For example, Massachusetts
and South Carolina allow campus carry when an individual obtains
the university’s consent.160 Michigan forbids concealed carry, but not
open carry, in classrooms and dorms.161 Missouri and Wyoming also
limit their campus carry bans to only concealed carry.162
Although the majority of states have not prohibited campus carry,
the majority of public universities have adopted their own measures

156. See id. at 249-50.
157. See Lewis, supra note 65, at 2113-17.
158. Id. at 2115.
159. See id. at 2115-16.
160. Id. at 2115 n.32, 2116 n.42; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10(j) (2021) (making it a
criminal violation to possess a firearm on college campuses without consent); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-23-420(A) (2009) (making it illegal to possess a firearm on college campuses without
consent). These are not absolute bans because they allow the universities to consent to
individual firearm possession; however, a university’s firearms policy could be deemed an
absolute ban depending on the circumstances in which it gives consent.
161. Lewis, supra note 65, at 2115 n.33. This means that in Michigan, those with a
concealed carry license can carry everywhere on campus except in dorms and classrooms. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.425o(1)(h) (2017). The statute is silent on open carry on campus. See
id.
162. See Lewis, supra note 65, at 2116 nn.34 & 43; MO. REV. STAT. § 571.107.1(10) (2014)
(prohibiting concealed carry on college campuses, but allowing concealed firearms to remain
in vehicles); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(t)(x) (2021) (prohibiting concealed carry on college
campuses unless written consent is obtained). Forbidding concealed carry, but not open carry,
is in accordance with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Heller and the Second Amendment.
See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 942 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“If there is
such a right [to carry in public], it is only a right to carry a firearm openly.”). At least one
commentator shares this view. See generally Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry for All:
Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486 (2014) (arguing
that the Second Amendment protects the right to open carry, but not concealed carry, in
public).
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to effectively ban guns on campus.163 This may conflict with the
Court’s recognition of an individual right to carry firearms under
the Second Amendment in Heller164 and subsequent federal case law
interpreting Heller and the Second Amendment to imply a right to
carry in public.165 In 2014, five state legislatures proposed bans on
campus carry, but not a single one passed.166 In contrast, as of 2019,
ten state legislatures had passed laws allowing concealed carry on
campus.167 The refusal by the majority of states to enact absolute
firearms bans on college campuses, combined with the trend by
states to compel colleges to allow some form of campus carry,168
shows that states are likely concerned about their universities
violating individual rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment.
In sum, historical gun measures illustrate the hesitancy by
colleges and our founding fathers to enact absolute bans on campus
carry. Although today most colleges ban guns on their own, most
state legislatures have refrained from enacting absolute bans on
campus carry.169 Instead, there has been a trend by state legislatures to force universities to loosen their restrictions and allow
campus carry in some form.170 Therefore, under Heller’s historical
analysis, there is little support that public universities can constitutionally enact total prohibitions on campus carry. It follows that
there exists some individual right to carry firearms on campus.
However, as the next Part explains, this right is extremely narrow,
and states and universities still retain broad power to enact gun
restrictions.
163. See, e.g., Weapons, Firearms, Combustibles, and Explosives, WM. & MARY (2020),
https://www.wm.edu/offices/deanofstudents/services/communityvalues/studenthandbook/w
eapons_firearms/ [https://perma.cc/E6Y7-KVS4] (effectively banning firearms from campus
by generally prohibiting firearms and reserving the right to refuse permission in any case);
see also Lewis, supra note 65, at 2116-17 (stating that the majority of U.S. universities ban
firearms).
164. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008).
165. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
166. Guns on Campus: Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/education/guns-on-campus-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/
WB7F-SRBR].
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.2031(d-1) (West 2016) (prohibiting universities
from generally banning concealed carry on campus).
169. See supra notes 158, 164 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
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III. HOW CAN STATES AND PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES REGULATE
FIREARMS?
As discussed above, Heller’s sensitive places dicta, lower court
case law, and history and tradition suggest that there is a narrow,
but constitutionally protected, right to keep and bear arms on the
campus of a public university. However, like other constitutional
rights, this right is not unlimited. States and public universities still
hold broad power to regulate firearms on campus without infringing
on individual rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment. The
circuit courts have largely applied or incorporated intermediate
scrutiny when assessing gun laws that are not complete bans on
firearms.171 This suggests that almost every gun restriction up to a
total prohibition on campus would be permissible.
A. Likely Permissible Regulations Under Heller
It is important to look at Heller for direction as to which campus
gun regulations may be permissible. Heller specifically mentioned
that some gun restrictions are “presumptively lawful” irrespective
of whether they are in sensitive places, such as “longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill.”172 This means that states and public universities can
presumptively ban “the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill.”173 However, the Court’s statement provides little
guidance for public universities because many states already generally ban these categories of people from possessing firearms.174
Furthermore, under Heller’s historical approach, it is likely permissible for public universities to prohibit students from possessing

171. See Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 672 (1st Cir. 2018); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 692 (6th Cir. 2016); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701
F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 473-74 (4th Cir. 2011);
Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 95,
97 (3d Cir. 2010).
172. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27, 627 n.26 (2008).
173. See id. at 626.
174. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308.2 (2021) (making it a crime for felons to possess
firearms).

2022]

FIREARMS ON CAMPUS

1073

firearms on campus given that the University of Virginia enacted
such a restriction in the nineteenth century with a board composed
of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.175 In the late nineteenth
century, Mississippi prohibited college students from concealed
carrying on campus, which under Heller’s historical approach, would
support the constitutionality of such a restriction today.176 However,
in order to appropriately assess specific gun restrictions that are
not absolute bans, it is necessary to look beyond Heller’s historical
approach. The Heller Court applied a historical approach and
rejected a specific level of scrutiny because the challenged law was
a complete ban on one of the “most popular” firearms for selfdefense.177 Thus, Heller did not foreclose the application of a specific
level of scrutiny in all circumstances.
B. Likely Permissible Regulations Under Intermediate Scrutiny
The Supreme Court has not specifically indicated which level of
scrutiny lower courts should apply to gun regulations that are not
complete bans.178 However, the federal circuit courts have largely
applied intermediate scrutiny to gun restrictions that are not
complete bans, which often leads to courts upholding the challenged
regulation.179 Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must
show: (1) an important governmental interest, and (2) that the law
is substantially related to that interest.180 If both elements are
satisfied, the court will uphold the law.181
In 2011, in a case commonly referred to as Heller II, the D.C.
Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld a D.C. law banning assault weapons and high-capacity magazines.182 The court
pointed to the dangerousness of assault weapons (and the speed at
which they can fire) to find that the law was substantially related
to the important “interest in crime control in the densely populated
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 148, at 250.
See id. at 251-52.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29.
See id. (refusing to apply a traditional tier of scrutiny).
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
See id.
Id. at 1262-64.
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urban area that is the District of Columbia.”183 Furthermore, the
ten-round magazine capacity restriction was substantially related
to the important interest of protecting innocent people and police
officers because high-capacity magazines enable criminals to shoot
more rounds and injure more people.184
Heller II shows that, at a minimum, states and universities in
densely populated urban areas could constitutionally prohibit
assault weapons and high-capacity magazines from campus.185
Additionally, Heller II shows that when intermediate scrutiny is
applied in the Second Amendment context, the first element is
almost always satisfied because controlling crime and protecting
innocent people are generally the goals behind all gun restrictions.186 Therefore, the determining element is often whether the
gun regulation is too overinclusive or too underinclusive to be considered substantially related to safety interests.187
In 2012, the Fifth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to uphold
a federal law that prohibited the commercial sale of pistols to people
under the age of twenty-one.188 The court reasoned the law was
sufficiently related to the important interest of controlling crime
because the law only applied to handguns, meaning that adults
between the ages of eighteen and twenty could still purchase long
guns.189 Furthermore, adults in that age range were responsible for
a large portion of homicides.190 This case shows that states and public universities could likely institute an age restriction to possess
183. Id. at 1262-63.
184. See id. at 1263-64.
185. See id. at 1262-64.
186. See id.; see also Geoff Dancy, Mirya Holman & Kayden McKenzie, The Origins of Gun
Policy in U.S. States, 60 WASH. UNIV. J.L. & POL’Y 171, 176-78 (2019) (explaining that gun
control policies are perceived by public health researchers to “lower the risk of fatalities” and
describing the belief that more guns lead to more crime); Laurel Loomis, A New Look at Gun
Control Legislation: Responding to a Culture of Violence, 27 BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS’N J. 160,
162 (1993) (explaining that the goal behind the Gun Control Act of 1968 “was to limit crime
by restricting public access to firearms”).
187. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012) (“As the
parties agree, New York has substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interests in public
safety and crime prevention. The only question then is whether the proper cause requirement
is substantially related to these interests.” (citations omitted)).
188. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives,
700 F.3d 185, 207 (5th Cir. 2012).
189. Id. at 208-09.
190. Id. at 210.
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certain firearms on campus, which could significantly lower the
number of guns on campus.
The lower federal court case law demonstrates the leniency of the
intermediate scrutiny standard when it is applied in the Second
Amendment context. Generally, when the lower courts apply intermediate scrutiny, the challenged gun restriction is upheld.191 It
would likely be even easier for campus gun restrictions to pass intermediate scrutiny. As scholars have noted, there are often high
densities of people on college campuses, and controversial material is often conveyed in college classrooms.192 Although this Note
disagrees that those characteristics make a place sensitive under
Heller,193 they remain important considerations when determining
whether a law passes intermediate scrutiny. For example, the high
densities of people on college campuses would support a public
university’s decision to implement more gun restrictions at campus
events or in crowded dorms or lecture halls.194 Limiting the gun
restrictions to those high-density areas would likely be substantially
related to the important governmental interest of campus safety.195
In sum, states and public universities have broad regulatory
power if intermediate scrutiny applies to gun restrictions that are
not complete bans. However, the Supreme Court’s upcoming decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen may clarify
what standard of scrutiny applies to challenged laws that are not
complete bans.196
Notably, then-Judge Kavanaugh dissented from the D.C. Circuit’s
majority opinion in Heller II.197 He argued that Heller’s historical
approach applies to all gun regulations and expressly rejected
intermediate scrutiny.198 Justice Thomas has criticized the lower
courts for purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny but actually

191. See, e.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir. 2013).
192. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
193. See supra Part II.C.1.
194. See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (emphasizing that the challenged
law applied to a “densely populated urban area”).
195. See id.
196. See de Vogue, supra note 60.
197. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1269-96 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 1271.
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applying a more permissive standard.199 In a dissent while she was
a judge on the Seventh Circuit, Justice Barrett expressed her
originalist and historical approach to the Second Amendment.200
Although the majority incorporated intermediate scrutiny in its
analysis,201 Barrett’s dissent failed to mention anything about
intermediate scrutiny.202 Recently, Justice Alito wrote a dissenting
opinion, joined by Justice Gorsuch and Justice Thomas, which
stated, “[a]lthough the courts below claimed to apply heightened
scrutiny, there was nothing heightened about what they did.”203
Justice Kavanaugh explained in a concurrence that he agreed with
Alito’s worries about lower courts improperly applying Heller and
McDonald.204
Given that a majority of the Supreme Court is skeptical about
lower courts’ application of Heller and their interpretation of the
Second Amendment, it is likely that the Court’s current makeup
would affirm the narrow constitutional right to carry on campus.
The Justices’ distrust in lower courts may also lead to an opinion
clarifying the Second Amendment. But until then, it is safe for public universities to assume their gun restrictions are constitutional
as long as they are substantially related to an important interest
and do not amount to a complete ban of firearms from campus.
CONCLUSION
Although policy reasons may indicate otherwise, contemporary
Second Amendment law strongly suggests that there is a narrow
constitutional right for individuals to carry firearms on the campus
199. See Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (“The Ninth Circuit claimed to be applying intermediate scrutiny, but its
analysis did not resemble anything approaching that standard.”).
200. See Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 447-48 (majority opinion).
202. See id. at 451-69 (Barrett, J., dissenting). Although Justice Barrett did not mention
intermediate scrutiny, she did mention that the majority’s holding “treat[ed] the Second
Amendment as a ‘second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the
other Bill of Rights guarantees.’” Id. at 469 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.
742, 780 (2010)).
203. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1541-42
(2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 1527 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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of a public university. The Supreme Court in Heller took a historical
approach to interpret the Second Amendment, holding that there is
an individual right to carry a firearm, for the purpose of selfdefense, within the home. Federal circuit courts have recognized
that Heller extends into the public arena. A close examination of
Heller’s sensitive places dicta illustrates the Court did not intend
for its dicta to encompass public universities. Even if it did, applying Heller’s historical approach to a total ban of firearms on campus
demonstrates that such a ban is unconstitutional under the Second
Amendment. However, states and public universities may still
heavily regulate firearms on campus as long as their regulations do
not amount to absolute bans or fail intermediate scrutiny.
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